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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RANDY RIVAS, by JOE RIVAS, his 
Guardian ad Litem, 
Plaintiff -Appellant, 
vs. 
PACIFIC FINANCE COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF 'THE CASE 
Case No. 
10,155 
This is an action for personal injuries sustained by 
the minor plaintiff when struck by defendant's auto-
mobile as he was riding a sled on a Salt Lake 'County 
street. 
DIS.POSITION IN LOWER ·COURT 
The case was tried before a jury, which returned 
a verdict for defendant, and after denial of his Motion 
for New Trial, plaintiff appealed. 
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PRELIMINARY STA·TEMENT 
·The parties will be designated as they appeared in 
the trial court. All references to the record refer to the 
pages numbered in red and the typed page numbers in 
the transcript of testimony are ignored. 
The statement of facts in plaintiff's brief is not 
accepted by the defendant and should not be favorably 
considered by this court, in view of the rule reiterated 
in Reynolds v. W. W. Clyde & Co., (1956), 5 Utah 2d 151, 
298 P.2d 531 : 
"Plaintiff presents her case on appeal by 
reciting facts tending most favorably to prove 
her claim. The opposite approach must be adop-
ted, and it hardly bears repeating that in a case 
like this the factual situation will be reviewed on 
appeal in the light most favorable to the party 
prevailing below." 
Defendant presents, in the following Statement of 
Facts, the evidence the jury reasonably could have be-
lieved and the inferences which the jury could have 
fairly drawn therefrmn, in arriving at its verdict. In Re. 
Richards Estate, (1956) 5 Utah 2d 106, 297 P.2d 542. 
STATEl\fEN·T OF FACTS 
This accident occurred on a snow-covered street 
in a residential area of southwest Salt Lake County (R. 
69). At the tilne of the accident the plaintiff. then age 5 
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years 8 months, was on his stomach on a sled in the 
westbound lane of traffic, in which lane defendant's 
car was traveling (R. 73). His position was such that 
he could not be seen by an automobile driver approach-
ing from the east until at a point 50 to 75 feet from 
the ultimate point of impact (R. 80), because the boy on 
the 1 sled was in a "blind spot" caused by a canal run-
ning under the road and creating a hump in the road 
east of the point of impact. A driver coming from the 
east and toward the point of impact was required to 
go up the eastern side of the hu1np, cross its ~op and 
then come down the west side (R. 80). The nature and 
extent of the hump, the grades before and after it and 
the effect upon a westbound driver's vision are all 
illustrated by the photographs that were placed in evi-
dence (Exhibits 4, 5, 6). 
The investigating deputy sheriff testified that he 
got in his automobile, during the investigation, and at-
tempted to retrace the route of the automoble that 
struck the plaintiff. As he did so, he noted the blind 
spot and tes1tified that a driver of a car coming from 
the east probably could not have seen the point of 
impact, and thus the child lying on his stomach on the 
sled in the ,yestbound lane of travel, until the car was 
"right on top of the rise" or about 50 to 75 feet away 
(R. 80, 82, 139). 
\Yhile the road was snow covered, it was much more 
slick than it appeared. The investigating officer said 
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it was very slick unde-rfoot but "we didn't realize how 
slick it was until we started walking" (R. 78). It was 
"hard to stand up" (R. 7'5). The road was so slick that 
after the impact it was difficult for the defendant driver 
and a witness to push and back the automobile away 
from the child who was then lodged under its front end 
(R .. 96). 
The defendant's driver testified he was traveling 
at about 15 ~to 20 miles per hour, observed some children 
about a block or a block and one-half away on his left 
but saw nothing else on the road (R. 131, 132). He was 
not aware of the extent of the blind spot, since his 
only previous travel on the road had been in the oppo-
site direction about 15 ~to 20 minutes earlier. On his 
return trip, going west, he drove up the east side of 
the hump and as he reached its top, and started across 
it and down the other side, he saw the child, attired in 
a bright red coat, lying on the sled in front of the car, 
in the west-bound lane of traffic. He immediately jam-
med on his brakes. The boy got up on his hands and 
tried to move toward the driver's left, so the driver 
swerved to his right, but "there was no time left" and 
"the car was on him" ( R. 133, 134). 
'The driver testified that while it now n1ight have 
been better to turn the other way, he reactc>d instantane-
ously, by reflex, and without time for reflection because 
of the emergency. As he put it. '" .... I did the best I 
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could. It may not have been the best, but it was the best 
I could do at the time" (R. 190). 
A witness called by Plaintiff, Mrs. Janice Wilker-
son, testified she had been driving east on the road, at 
a point some distance west of the impact, and saw the 
child lying face down on his sled in the roadway (R. 
95). Her testimony and the investigation of the investi-
gating officer established the fact the defendant's driver 
was not traveling at an excessive speed. 
The plaintiff resided at a point a block east of the 
scene of the accident, and although his mother was h01ne 
she did not know he was out in the street. Because of 
the hump in the road she could not see the street where 
the boy was (R. 123). Both she and her husband had 
repeatedly admonished the child about the dangers of 
cars and to stay out of the roadway, and although the 
rhild was a bright, intelligent youngster, he apparently 
did not obey his parents. The jury verdict in favor of 
the defendant was unanimous. Plaintiff's timely motion 
for a new trial was argued to the court and denied. 
This appeal followed. 
AR.GUMENT 
POINT I. 
UNDER THE EVIDENCE, THE ISSUES OF DEFEND-
ANT'S NEGLIGENCE AND PLAINTIFF'S CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE WERE CLEARLY FOR THE JURY TO DE-
TERMINE AND THE COURT, THEREFORE, PROPERLY 
DENIED PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VER-
DICT. 
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Plaintiff's contention that a verdict should have been 
directed in his favor at the close of all the evidence 
ignores the basic principles which permit the invocation 
of that drastic procedure and conveniently disregards 
the principles which delineate the functions of judge and 
jury under our judicial system. 
·The tests which the evidence must meet in order to 
justify the granting of a directed verdict have been 
clearly and repeatedly set out by this Court in its deci-
sions. As is stated in Finlayson v. Brady} (1952) 121 Utah 
204, 240 P. 2d 491, 492, it is a fundamental rule that: 
"In directing a verdict, this court has held, as 
authorities generally hold, that the evidence is to 
be examined in a light most favorable to the party 
against whom the verdict is intended, and that it 
is not the province of the court to \Yeigh or deter-
mine the preponderance of the evidence." 
This fundamental principle was repeated in Boskovich 
v. Utah Construction Co.J (1953) 123 Utah 387, 259 P. 
2d 885, and in decisions since so frequently as to require 
no further citation. And, that this rule governs not only 
claims asserted by a plaintiff, but also that it "applies 
with equal force to an affirn1ative defense by the de-
fendant," as in the present case, is shown by f.."' elson r. 
BramesJ (lOth Cir., 1958) 253 F. 2d 381. 
If a trial court has resolved every controYerted 
fact in the evidence and <"VPry inference therefrmn in a 
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light most favorable to the defendant, it still may not 
grant a directed verdict against a defendant unless there 
is no evidence to support any of the asserted defenses. 
As this .Court stated in the recent case of Charvoz v. 
rottrell, (1961) 12 Utah 2d 25, 361 P. 2d 516: 
"·Certainly if there is a conflict in the evi-
dence the question of negligence is not one of 
law, but one of fact to be determined by the jury. 
However, even if the facts are undisputed, if fair-
Ininded men can honestly draw different conclu-
sion from them, the issue of negligence should be 
settled by a jury. In other words, negligence is 
a question for the jury unless all reasonable men 
must draw the same conclusion from the facts 
as they are shown." 
The plaintiff here has made no attempt whatever 
to bring himself within the rules outlined above. In-
stead of resolving every conflict in the evidence and 
inference therefrom in favor of defendant, as he is re-
quired to do, he attempts to give himself the benefit 
of every bit and shred of evidence and every tenuous 
inference therefrmn which he is able to extract from the 
record and which, even indirectly, tends to support his 
contention that children may have been in the general 
area fifteen or twenty minutes before the accident. From 
these unsupported and largely discredited bits and 
pieces of testimony 'v-hich defendant's driver, Mr. George, 
directly, unequivocally and convincingly contradicted, 
plaintiff draws the totally unwarranted and patently 
self-serving conclusion that: 
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"The only reasonable conclusion that can be 
drawn from the testimony ... is that when Mr. 
George was eastbound on Crystal Avenue fifteen 
to twenty minutes before he struck the respondent 
(sic), he had seen the child playing in the same 
general area. He knew where the child was and 
what he was doing. When he returned westbound 
on Crystal A venue he knew that children had 
been playing in the area where the accident oc-
curred." (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff's Brief p. 6. 
As this excerpt from this brief clearly shows, plain-
tiff seeks to have this Court cast aside applicable rules 
of law and permit him to stretch the facts and inferences 
therefrom beyond all reasonable limits despite a jury 
verdict against him. He seeks, on the basis of indirect, 
contradicted and discredited evidence in the record to 
have this Court hold, as a matter of law, that defendant's 
driver saw plaintiff 15 minutes prior to the accident and 
thus knew both where he was and '""hat he was doing at 
the time of the accident. Such a patently absurd attempt 
to circumvent submission of that question to tlw jury 
cannot be sustained. 
Having thus attempted by n1ental sleight of hand to 
impute to Mr. George actual knowledge of plaintiff's 
presence in the area prior to the accident, when in fact 
none existed, plaintiff next attempts to couple that sup-
posed "knowledge" with an inaccurate and, again, slanted 
version of events immediately preceding the accident to 
support his even more tenuous contention that defend-
ant's driver was negligent, as a matter of law, in failing 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
to avoid the accident. liere again he attempts to rely 
upon contro,~erted facts and inferences in the record 
which tPnd to support his position and completely disre-
gard and ignore the great body of evidence which clearly 
rebuts any contention of negligence on the part of the 
defendant. Disputed facts and questionable inferences 
in the trial court do not mature into uncontradicted 
proof during their journey to the Supreme Court. 
Plaintiff's contentions disregard, for example, the 
Pvidence that the roadway was snow packed and decep-
tivel~r slick in the area of the accident; that defendant's 
driver was traveling at a slow and reasonable rate of 
speed prior to and at the time of the accident; that plain-
tiff could not be seen by Mr. George until he was almost 
upon him; that plaintiff's presence upon the highway 
in a prone position at the point of the accident was 
highly unusual and unexpected; and that the situation 
facing the driver when he first became aware of the 
peril was clearly an emergency to which he had to react 
instantaneously. 
Plaintiff also contends, as he must, that there was 
no evidence of contributory negligence to submit to the 
jury. In support of this contention he once again picks 
out yarious portions of the evidence which tend to sup-
port his claimed freedom from fault and resolves all 
factual disputes and inferences in his own favor. 
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Certainly a jury question as to plaintiff's contribu-
tory negligence is presented where, as here, the plaintiff 
was lying on a sled in a prone position, out of the line 
of sight of west-bound vehicles, on the well-traveled but 
slick county road when the accident occurred. 
The jury was instructed that defendant claimed as 
negligent conduct on the part of plaintiff only that he 
"was riding on his stomach on his sled on the highway 
along which defendant's driver was traveling and below 
the point of vision of defendant's driver due to a canal 
that raised the surface of the road" (R. 34). They were 
also instructed that a child is not held to the same 
standard of conduct as an adult but is required to exer-
cise that degree of care which ordinarily would be used 
by children of the same age, intelligence and experience 
under the same or similar circumstances. 
Being thus carefully limited and explained by the 
trial court, the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence 
was properly submitted to the jury under the doctrine 
of Mann v. Fa,irbourn, (1961) 1:2 lTtah 2d 342, 366 P.2d 
603, 606, which, incidentally, also involved a 5 year 
old boy: 
"If the trial judge, after a consideration of 
the age, experience and capacity of the child to 
understand and avoid risks and dangers to which 
it was exposed in the actual circumstances and 
situation of the case, detennines that fair-minded 
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n1en might honestly differ as to whether the chil-
dren failed to exercise that degree of care that is 
usually exercised by persons of similar age, ex-
pPrience and intelligence, the question of the 
child's contributory negligence should be submit-
ted to the jury .... " 
It is significant, we believe, that plaintiff concludes 
his attack on the refusal to direct a verdict in his favor 
with the statement that the "weight of the evidence estab-
lishes that :Mr. George did have knowledge of the presence 
of appellant, and that he failed to take the precautions 
the law required under such circumstances." (Emphasis 
added). As this statement shows, he complains that the 
trial court did not weigh the evidence rather than submit 
it to the jury. Neither the trial court, nor this court on 
appeal, has that prerogative which, under our system, 
is reserved to the jury. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON 
ALL ISSUES RAISED BY THE EVIDENCE, INCLUDING 
ALL ISSUES UPON WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED 
TO RELY. 
Plaintiff contends that by its Instructions No. 1 and 
2 the court in effect directed a jury verdict for defend-
ant. Specifically, plaintiff objects to that portion of In-
struction K o. 1 ·which advised the jury that defendant's 
only clain1 of negligence on the part of plaintiff \Yas that 
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he "was riding on his stomach on a sled on the highway 
along which defendant's driver was traveling and below 
the point of defendant's vision due to a canal that raised 
the surface of the road." 
Plaintiff's objection to this explanation of the lim-
ited nature of defendant's claim of negligence on plain-
tiff's part is surprising in view of the fact that the court 
earlier in the same introductory instruction similarly 
explained plaintiff's claimed grounds of negligence 
against defendant (R. 33). 
Plaintiff's objection to Instruction No. 2 is directed 
to that portion which requires plaintiff to prove each 
and every material element of his case as well as proxi-
mate cause by a preponderance of the evidence and which 
"entitles him to recover" upon doing so, unless barred 
by his own contributory negligence. Plaintiff does not 
mention the fact that this same instruction specifically 
required that the defendant establish contributory negli-
gence by a preponderance of the e·vidence. 
There is no merit to plaintiff's contention that the 
effect of Instructions No. 1 and 2 was to tell the jury 
that if plaintiff was lying on the sled in the road that 
fact alone constituted contributory negligence. To begin 
with, the court specificall~v told the jury in Instruction 
No. 1 that it was merely sununarizing "the contentions 
of the parties" (R. 34). Secondly, the tenn "contributor~r 
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negligence" is expressly defined in Instruction No. 3 as 
a want of ordinary care on the part of an injured person 
which proximately contributes to his own injury (R. 37). 
Thirdly, the standard of care expected of a child is set 
forth fully in Instruction No. 11 as that standard was 
(\nunciated by this Court in the recent case of Mann v. 
Fairbo?t.rn, supra. Thus, plaintiff wants this Court to 
hold that the jury failed to consider all of the instruc-
tions and. all of the evidence and "reach such a verdict 
as will do justice between the parties" as it was in-
~tructed to do (R. 51). 
Plaintiff's objection to that portion of Instruction 
No. 2 which requires for a finding of contributory negli-
gence that the "negligence proximately contributed in 
·some degree to his own injuries" likewise has no merit. 
(Emphasis added). His statement that there is no dis-
tinguishable difference between the phrase "in some de-
gree" and "in any degree," disregards the basic diction-
ary definition of those terms. Thus, "any" is defined in 
Webster's Unabridged Dictionary as "indicating that 
which is considered, despite very great or slight quantity 
or extent" or "one part or individual without regard to 
which or how great or small." The word "some" on the 
other hand is defined as "that is of an unspecified but 
appreciable or not inconsiderable quantity, amount, de-
gree, etc.; more than a little; that are in number at least, 
or more than a few." None of the words or phrases used 
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by Webster's in defining "some," indicate a slight or 
insignificant quantity or amount as is the case ·with 
"any" as noted above. 
This difference in meaning between the terms 
"some" and "any" easily answers the contention made 
by plaintiff that he was prejudiced by the use of the 
word "some" in Instruction No. 2. The distinction has 
been repeatedly recognized by the decisions of this Court 
and others, where it has been said that "some" is neither 
the equivalent of "any" as used in Taylor v. Johnson, 
(1964) 393 P. 2d 384, Case No. 9874; Johnson v. Le1cis, 
(19'52) 121 Utah 218, 240 P. 2d 498; Devine v. Cook, 
(1955) 3 Utah 2d 134, 279 P. 2d 1073; Ferguson v. 
Jongsma, (1960) 10 Utah 2d 179, 350 P. 2d 404; and 
Annotation 87 A.L.R. 2d 1448-49, nor the equivalent 
of "however slight" used in Devine v. Cook, s·upra; 
Johnson v. Lewis, supra,; Wilson v. City & County of 
San Francisco, (Calif., 1959) 3-1-± P. 2d 828, cited in 
plaintiff's brief. 
Even had the tenn "any" been used instead of 
"some," however, it is clear that under the facts present-
ed no prejudice could have resulted to plaintiff since if 
he were found by the jury to have been contributorily 
negligent, there can be no doubt but that such negligence 
necessarily would have been a substantial contributing 
cause of his injuries in this case. The total effect of the 
court's instructions, moreover, contrary· to what plain-
tiff now claims, was to present, fully and fairly, all 
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clai1ns asserted by plaintiff as well as the defenses as-
serted by defendant and, on the whole, there can be no 
doubt but that plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity 
to prrsent his case to the jury. And, although the use 
of the term "any" in the instructions would have been 
improper, such an error, on balance, would not have 
been prejudicial to the extent to require a reversal under 
all the facts. 
The case of Mack v. Precast lndustries, Inc., (Mich., 
1963) 120 N. W. 2d 225, as the excerpt therefrom at pp. 
11-12 of plaintiff's brief clearly shows, has no applica-
tion whatever to the present case. In that case the trial 
court erred in holding the plaintiff to a higher standard 
of care than that which he required of the defendant. 
Instruction No. 4, to which plaintiff takes exception, 
is patterned closely after Jury Instruction Forms, Utah, 
Form No. 16.6. Although it would have been proper for 
the court to have been used instead plaintiff's requested 
Instruction No. 7, that instruction adds very little to 
the principle of the instruction actually given and would 
not materially aid the jury in resolving the issues of 
negligence. Rather, by referring to a specific statute 
it might have tended to confuse them. 
The trial court of necessity must be given some 
leeway in selecting his instructions for the jury and 
cannot be required to accept every variation on a stand-
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ard instruction such as this one which counsel can con-
' ' jure up. Plaintiff is straining at a gnat in seriously sug-
gesting that this instruction was prejudicial to him. 
Plaintiff complains of that portion of Instruction 
No. 8 which advised the jury that 
" . . . extrordinary care was not required, and 
that while exceptional caution and skill are to be 
admired and encouraged the law does not demand 
them as a standard of conduct." 
The challenged language is taken almost verbatim from 
J.I.F.U., Form No. 15-2, and while that fact does not 
insure its propriety, the instruction has received wide-
spread use and is generally utilized in such cases by our 
trial courts. The portion of Instruction K o. 8 relating to 
judging the driver's conduct by the then existing cir-
cumstances and not by hindsight, and Instruction No. 9, 
relating to proper lookout, are but simple state1nents of 
basic law. It is sub1nitted that plaintiff's objection to 
t h<'RP instructions de1nonstrates the inherent weakness of 
hiR appeal. 
PiuintiffR r<'quested Instruction No. 7, as noted 
nhov<', add~ nothing whatPYPr to the court's Instruction 
No.7 relatin' to the grounds upon "~I1icl1 defendant could 
h<' fonnd JH'gligent. In fad, a careful analysis of In-
:·d rudion No. 7, as giY<'H hy the court, clear]~~ shows that 
it wn~ h<'nvil~· W{~ig-hted in plaintiff's favor. It told the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
jury, for example, that defendant's driver had to "keep 
a proper lookout for Randy Rivas" "and to exercise 
reasonable care to anticipate the presence of said child," 
even though the evidence was wholly contradictory and 
largely discredited as to whether Mr. George knew or 
should have known that plaintiff was even in the gen-
eral area. 
Instruction No. 12, to which objection is made, is 
again taken from J.I.F.U., Form No. 16.1. While an 
instruction on unavoidable accident should not be given 
in every case, the doctrine is, nevertheless, particularly 
applicable where, as here, a reasonable person might 
conclude that neither party was negligent in that the 
roads were snow-packed and unexpectedly slick, the 
plaintiff was not visible until the vehicle was almost 
upon him, the plaintiff was in a prone position and at 
a point where he would not normally be expected and 
defendant's driver did what he could in the emergency 
to avoid the accident. 
None of the cases cited by plaintiff on the unavoid-
able accident issue apply in the present case: The case 
of Rodoni v. llaskin, (Mont., 1960) 355 P. 2d 296, re-
ferred to in plaintiff's brief, involved a dP.fendant who 
admitted knowing that the roads were slick and that he 
had failed to slow for a chuckhole with which he was 
familiar and which he knew "could throw" his car if he 
hit it, notwithstanding he had seen plaintiff's car ap-
proaching. The chuckhole threw his car into the opposite 
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lane of travel and it collided head-on with plaintiff's car. 
This case does not support plaintiff under the present 
facts. Rather, the court there stated that the unavoidable 
accident instruction was helpful to a jury and should be 
used in appropriate cases. 
In the case of K reh v. Trinkle, (Kan., 1959) 343 P. 
2d 213, upon which plaintiff also relies, the defendant 
admitted that he did not see the other vehicle into which 
he collided at an intersection until just before impact 
although there was nothing which kept him from doing 
so. 'The court there held that an unavoidable accident 
instruction would be "peculiary appropriate" where 
"from the evidence the jury could reasonably conclude 
that there was neither negligence nor contributory negli-
gence." Such is the state of the evidence in the present 
case. 
In Wellman v. Noble, (1961) 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 
P. 2d 701, this Court, as plaintiff notes, held that such 
an instruction is proper in an appropriate case. In 
Porter v. Price, (1960) 11 Utah 2d 80, 355P. 2d 66, 68, 
to which the Wellman case refers, this Court noted, in 
harmony with the J( rPh case, supra, that: 
" ... there are some situations where the 
evidence is susceptible of being so interpreted 
that an accident occurred without negligence on 
the part of anyone, and if it is reasonably sus-
ceptibl~ of such. interpretation, and a party re-
quests 1t, the tnal court commits no error in so 
advising the jury." 
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( ~h•nrly, this statements cover the situation presented 
h~· t itP PvidencP in the present case. 
Plaintiff's objection to Instruction No. 13, covering 
tlw law applicable to a driver confronted with an emer-
gt>ney, iH patently absurd. Again he seeks to impute to 
defendant's driver, as a matter of law, actual knowledge 
ot' plaintiff's presence and position, although the evidence 
iH in conflict and wholly unsatisfactory on the point. 
Kn•n asstnning he had previously seen the child in the 
gt•neral area, however, and plaintiff is not entitled to 
<'laim in this Court that he did, that would be no basis 
upon which to predicate his fault, as a matter of law, 
in failing to anticipate that the boy would be in a prone 
position on the roadway and out of his vision until he 
was right upon him. The mere statement of that posi-
tion reveals its transparency. Defendant's driver did not 
and could not reasonably have been expected to see or 
antieipate plaintiff's danger until he came into his view. 
e nder those circumstances he was faced with the clearest 
kind of an emergency. Plaintiff's objection to that in-
struction is but a further twist of the facts to gain an 
advantage to which he is clearly not entitled under the 
law. 
The basic purpose underlying plaintiff's wholly un-
~npportable fly -speck assault upon the claimed total 
effect of the Court's instructions, is to bring himself 
within the rule of Taylor v. Johnson, S1.tpra, with the 
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claim that the instructions so emphasized defense theories 
they prejudiced the jury against plaintiff and deprived 
him of a fair trial. A eomparison of that case with the 
present one, however, readily demonstrates their dis-
similarity and the propriety of the instructions given in 
this case. 
At the outset it will be noted that the factual situ-
ations presented by these two cases are entirely dis-
similar. In Taylor, moreover, 47 instructions were given, 
compared to 17 here. 
In Taylor the "instructions contained no direct con-
cise statement of the main determinative issues of fact 
in the case," such as are set forth in Instructions No. 1, 
2 and 7 here. 
In Taylor at least ten different instructions "ended 
with a long, repetitious statement that such a finding 
required a verdict for the defendant" and three other 
instructions recited the same conclusions, whereas only 
Instruction No. 8 ended with that language here. More-
over, in Taylor, "such statements ·w-ere ... emphasized 
with repetitious and capital letters." 
In Taylor at least three instructions were "based on 
an entirely different factual situation" which "had no 
application" to that case "and tended to mislead the 
jury." No such situation exists here. 
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In Tay/01·, also, "many other instructions" were 
givPn on tlw <lPfPnsP of contributory negligence and "em-
phn::-;it.Pd faet situations which were not supported by the 
Pvi<lPIH'P." No ~meh abuse is found in this record. 
In short, plaintiff has shown no real prejudice here. 
His complaints are such as could be directed with equal 
for<'P ag-ainst almost any set of jury instructions which 
might be given in this type of case. 
Plaintiff's final contention that he was prejudiced 
hy tlw court's refusal to grant his requested Instructions 
No. 3, 5, 7 and 11 is also wholly without justification. 
I I is request No. 3 which would require defendant's 
driver "to be aware of ... persons" on the street incor-
rPctly states the duty required of him, since the law does 
not require that he be aware of a person's presence on 
the street until he sees, or in the exercise of reasonable 
eare he should see, the person. Even so, however, the 
Court's Instruction No. 7, which required Mr. George 
•·to keep a proper lookout for Randy Rivas ... and to 
f'xercise reasonable care to anticipate the presence of 
said child," in effect, imposes the srune heavy duty 
sought to be imposed by plaintiff's request No. 3. The 
balance of request No. 3, relating to the duty to use 
reasonable care, was fully covered in Instructions No. 
:1. 7 and 10. 
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The contention that the failure to give plaintiff's 
requests No. 5 and 7 constitutes reversible error has 
already been discussed above. 
Plaintiff's request No. 7, relating to the degree of 
care required toward children, assumes that the person 
charged with negligence was aware not only that 
a specific person is subject to foreseeable risk of 
harm but also that such person is a child and, hence, 
even more likely than an adult to be harmed due to his 
youthful propensities. In the present case, the driver 
was totally unaware of the presence of plaintiff in the 
area of the accident until he came into view. The fact 
that he was a child rather than an adult could have had 
no effect whatever upon Mr. George's reaction when he 
became aware of his peril. Request No. 3, therefore, 
has no proper application to the present facts and it 
was properly denied. 
CONCLUSION 
No claim of prejudice or impropriety has been made 
as to the court's conduct of the trial itself. The court's 
instructions are the target of plaintiff's attack. 
'There is an abundance of support in the record and 
in applicable law to uphold the instructions given by the 
court as well as the jury verdict in this case. As has 
been noted, plaintiff has cited neither authority nor 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
t~vidPtl<'P which demands a different conclusion. Although 
t hPn' was PvidPIH'<' from which the jury could have 
found in plaintiff's favor under the instructions given, 
t lw ,!..!,T(•at \n•ight of the evidence, and the jury's verdict, 
wPrP in favor of dPfPndant. 
Plaintiff had his day in court and the issues were 
found gain~t him. He had his case fairly and fully pre-
sPntPd to the jury. His many allegations of error are 
:-;upporh•d neither in the record nor by the authorities. 
rrhe words of ,Justice Crockett in Hales v. Peterson, 
(l Dlil) 11 Utah 2d -t-11, 360 P. 2d 822, 825-25 are partic-
nlarl~· appropriate here: 
'' \V e have heretofore recognized the impor-
tance of safeguarding the right of trial by jury. 
A necessary corollary to it is that there must be 
some solidarity in the result so that it can be 
rPlied upon. To the extent the verdict can easily 
he sC't aside by the court, the right to trial by jury 
is ''~·eakened. In order to give substance to the 
right, once the trial has been had and a verdict 
rendered, it should not be regarded lightly, nor 
oyerturned because of errors or irregularities un-
less they are of sufficient consequence to have 
afferted the result. 
··~\nyone acquainted with the practical opera-
tion of a trial by jury and the human factors that 
1nust play a part therein is aware that it would 
be aln1ost impossible to complete a trial of any 
length without some things occurring with which 
rounsPl. after the case is lost, can find fault and, 
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in zeal for his cause, all quite in good faith, magni-
fy into error which to him and the losing parties 
seems blameable for their failure to prevail. How-
ever, from the standpoint of administering even-
handed justice the ·Court must dispassionately 
survey such claims against the over-all picture 
of the trial, and if the parties have been afforded 
an opportunity to fully and fairly present their 
evidence and arguments upon the issues, a~d the 
jury has made its determination thereon, the ob-
jective of the proceeding has been accomplished. 
And the judgment should not be disturbed unless 
it is shown that there is error which is substantial 
and prejudicial in the sense that it appears there 
is a reasonable likelihood that the result would 
have been different in the absence of such error 
" 
This appeal is without merit. The judgment should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN H. SNOW 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
701 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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